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ABSTRACT  
The American Constitution has been the subject of heated 
debate since its formation. This article simply introduces a new 
argument. It suggests that there exists a “form”1 of an 
Enlightenment era code, which is met by the Constitution, and that 
the requirements of this form can be derived from inspection of the 
three great codes of the time: the Prussian, the Austrian, and the 
French. It further notes that these requirements are (1) Roman law 
influence; (2) natural law influence; and (3) that they perform the 
same functions—they abrogate the prior laws on their respective 
subjects and they are “complete” in themselves, covering the 
whole aspect of a legal field. In the process of doing so, the essay 
shows that the common law was not the only source of inspiration 
for the framers of the Constitution; it also shows heavy civil law 
influences. The article opens with a “preliminary title”, which 
introduces the subject, its sources, and instructs the readers as to 
                                                                                                             
 1. This notion of form comes from Aristotle instead of Plato. Instead of the 
form existing outside and entirely separate from the thing under discussion, I 
find that the form may exist within and be discoverable in, the things under 
discussion.  




how to read the article itself. The whole closes by laying forth a 
few broad possible consequences of accepting this view, while 
leaving a full discussion on the consequences of this understanding 
to a later article.  
I. PRELIMINARY TITLE2 
A. Introduction  
The Age of Enlightenment (commonly “the Enlightenment”) 
lasted throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and the nineteenth 
centuries. This era observed some of our world’s most pivotal 
moments: the Renaissance came to an end; a global economic 
climate was just starting to appear; slavery was being banned in the 
western world; the divine right of kings was—at last—being 
challenged; Napoléon was gaining ground in his conquest of 
Europe, only to meet defeat at Waterloo; the British Empire rose to 
prominence; the once-prestigious Holy Roman Empire fell into 
oblivion; and a new republic was born across the sea, destined to 
grow into a super power in its own right.  
But not all important events of the Enlightenment were 
geopolitical. Philosophy was having yet another reformation. 
During this age of man, humanity was given the minds and 
thoughts of brilliant political theorists and jurists such as Locke, 
Rousseau, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Martini, Voltaire, Puffendorf, 
Domat, and Grotius, to name only a few. These people laid the 
foundation of our modern society. They gave us the separation of 
                                                                                                             
 2. The term “preliminary title” was chosen for this section instead of 
“introduction” as it does far more than merely introduce the subject. Indeed, the 
first subsection under this heading is “introduction.” This term is in reference to 
that portion of modern codes which lays out what the sources of law are and 
how the document is to be interpreted. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1-14. I have 
organized this first section of the paper in much the same fashion. I give the 
sources of my criteria, and describe how this essay is to be understood. Even the 
introduction names sources, for those events and minds described therein played 
vital roles in setting the stage for the Codes and the Constitution.  




powers, limited self-government, the French Encyclopédisme,3 and 
codification of law in new form.  
This humanist movement saw one of the few instances where 
high thought would be brought down and put into practical 
application.4 Many saw that the law of nature (natural law) could 
be a source of the positive law, or instruction on what that should 
be. The robust spirit of the age described gave hope that law could 
be eternal and that principles of the same could be written down 
for all humanity, not just Europe, not just the Western hemisphere, 
but for all of the world. To achieve this end, civilians developed 
codes.5 But natural law was not the sole source of these 
documents. It is indisputable that the drafters looked to Roman 
law6 and customary law7 to forge these great codes.  
I do not mean “code” in the contemporary sense.8 For example, 
I do not mean a publication in which statutes are kept and 
constantly updated, as one would describe the U.S. Code. Nor do I 
mean a book into which one collects pre-existing rules of law 
without, inter alia, usurping the prior law, which is more properly 
                                                                                                             
 3. This compilation of work was intending to put all of human knowledge 
in one place. It dealt heavily with philosophy and law. Some have even noted 
the larger movement around this document, calling it “French Encyclopédisme”. 
See generally Mitchell Franklin, The Encyclopédiste Origin and Meaning of 
Fifth Amendment, 15 LAW. GUILD REV. 41 (1955-1956) [hereinafter The 
Encyclopédiste]. 
 4. Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Future of The Civil Law, 37:3 LA. L. REV. 645, 
647 (1976-1977) (Explaination, logic and reason were never divorced, however, 
from social reality; the civil law absorbed these higher law elements “without 
detriment to the practical needs of society”).  
 5. Roscoe Pound, The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1:1 LA. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (1938) (explaining universal validity of the codes); see also H. Patrick 
Glenn, The Grounding of Codification, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 765, 766 (1997-
1998) (explaining the codes’ capability to extend beyond Europe). 
 6. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 111-23 (Cambridge 
Press, New York 2007) (explaining Roman law influences in the three great 
codes) [hereinafter ROMAN LAW]; see also Pan. J. Zepos, The Legacy of the 
Civil Law, 34:5 LA. L. REV. 895, 902 (1974) (stating “The Roman law, together 
with customary law . . . formed the chief sources of inspiration for the great 
codifications.”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. I must digress briefly and say that I am not the first, nor shall I be the 
last, to point out features of codification. See JACQUES VANDERLINDEN, LE 
CONCEPT DE CODE EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE DU XIIIe AU XIXe SIECLE (1967).  




called a Digest. A code, in the understanding of this essay is an 
Enlightenment code; or, as has been described by previous 
scholarship, a natural law code.9 These are documents created from 
the above-mentioned sources that serve a distinct function and 
require a distinct form of interpretation.  
The function is both of completeness and abrogation. These 
two concepts will be reviewed more thoroughly below but deserve 
mention here. Codes in the understanding of the Enlightenment, 
were to be all-encompassing.10 This doctrine meant that all 
possible situations dealing with the type of law covered by the 
codes were to have their decisions based on the same—the codes 
covered everything and were meant to extend for centuries.11 To 
realize this end, two methods were used; discussion on which will 
wait for the appropriate article. Abrogation, on the other hand, is a 
more simple function to discuss.12 Put briefly, these codes, 
although drawn from prior law, dispensed with the control of the 
prior law.13 Lawyers were not permitted to cite to the former rules, 
as the codes were the sole source of law.14  
                                                                                                             
 9. See generally Horst Klaus Lucke, The European Natural Law Codes: 
The Age of Reason and the Powers of Government, 31 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 7 
(2012). By this I mean that these codes were heavily influenced by the 
eighteenth century and medieval understandings of a “higher law” based on 
human reason.  
 10. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766. 
 11. Id. See also Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of 
Codification, 48:5 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1988) (stating, “Codes last much 
longer than ordinary statutes, some lasting centuries; they are subject to 
(usually) very minor and very rare changes.”). 
 12. I must make an aside and note that the new drafting of the Louisiana 
Civil Code lacks an abrogation article.  
 13. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in 
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 37 (2012) (showing 
the need for an abrogation clause and the necessity of breaking from the prior 
law); see also Bergel, supra note 11, at 1074 (“[the codes] repeal [] the old legal 
system (laws, ordinances or customs) that were dealt with specifically in the 
new civil code.”).  
 14. From an earlier draft of the Prussian Civil Code, THE FREDERICIAN 
CODE: OR, A BODY OF LAW FOR THE DOMINIONS OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA: 
FOUNDED ON REASON, AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY at Pt. I, Bk. I, 
T. II, § 5 (Jean-Henri-Samuel Formey & Alexandre-Auguste de Campagne 
trans., Edinburgh 1761): “. . . we discharge the advocates from quoting hereafter 
the authority of the Roman Law or that of any doctor whomsoever.” [hereinafter 




There is now almost no dispute that three codes in particular 
are considered great among their peers.15 It is from these three 
codes that the author has drawn his understanding of the 
Enlightenment codes. They are, the Allgemeines Landrecht für die 
Preußischen Staaten (ALR), drafted under King Frederick of 
Prussia (hereinafter called the Prussian Civil Code); the Austrian 
Civil Code, drafted largely by Martini, under Emperor Joseph of 
the Holy Roman Empire; and the Code Napoléon (hereinafter 
Code civil), drafted under the guidance of Portalis and passed 
under the eyes of Napoléon Bonaparte.16 Moreover, reference from 
time to time may be made to the Louisiana Civil Code, which has 
been described as “the most perfect child of the Civil Law.”17  
Even though all these events were taking place in Europe, one 
should not ignore what was happening “across the pond.” As one 
may tell by the title of this essay, there was yet another document 
in the same vein as the three great codes. It, too, as will be shown 
below, meets all three requirements for being an Enlightenment 
code. It has Roman law and Natural Law sources, and can be 
characterized by its “completeness”18 and has lasted over centuries 
                                                                                                             
 
THE FREDERICIAN CODE]. See also ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL 
LAW 131 (Harvard Univ. Press 1981) (stating, “the preexisting law ceases to 
have even subsidiary force.” “The Code itself becomes the historical starting 
point.”).  
 15. Lucke, supra note 9 (discussing the Prussian, the Austrian and the 
French Codes); see also Glenn, supra note 5, at 767 (noting the poetic majesty 
of the Code civil); Zepos, supra note 6, at 902 (drawing particular attention to 
the French Code civil and the Austrian Civil Code); and Cueto-Rua, supra note 
4, at 650 (stating “The Civil Law gave full recognition to this basic philosophy 
in the three great codes enacted at the end of the XVIII Century and the 
beginning of the XIX Century: the Code Napoleon in France, the Civil Code for 
the Kingdom of Prussia, and the Austrian Civil Code.”). 
 16. Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 651 (discussing the Code Napoléon, the 
Prussian Civil Code, and the Austrian Civil Code); see generally Lucke, supra 
note 9 (discussing the Prussian Civil Code, the Austrian Civil Code and the 
Code civil).  
 17. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18 (1956). 
 18. The broad provisions let generally applicable rules stretch forward 
continuously and to unseen situations. Moreover, since the Federal government 
is one of the enumerated powers, the specific listing of those powers (and those 




with comparatively little revision.19 Therefore, what Field said 
more than a century ago shall be proven true on a different basis: 
the United States Constitution is “a great code in a small 
compass.”20 Thus, the thesis of my paper is this: The American 
Constitution may be properly understood as an Enlightenment 
code, regardless of the specific intent of the framers, because it 
meets three criteria discovered by reference to the three great 
codes: it has heavy Roman law influences, natural law influences, 
and serves the two primary functions of the codes—(1) it abrogates 
control of the Articles of Confederation and the English common 
law on the subject of foundational national law, and (2) it is 
“complete in itself,” as it, by use of broad generalities and specific 
enumeration, covers the whole arena of fundamental law for the 
nation and is capable of extending eternally forward with little 
revision.  
B. Answers to Two Objections 
Throughout the crafting of the arguments in this essay, I was 
confronted by several objections raised by classmates. Instead of 
                                                                                                             
 
necessary and proper to the same) means that the Constitution is literally 
complete as to all the basic rules of our government. This rule will be dealt with 
more fully in Article III of this essay. 
 19. There are several other similarities between the documents, which are 
not discussed fully in this paper. The documents all arose out of much 
controversy, political upheaval, and philosophical change. The controversies and 
turmoil surrounding Civil Codes has been noted before. (Bergel, supra note 11, 
at 1077). They are held in almost the same reverence. Of the Civil Codes it was 
said, they “are Constitutions for civil society.” (Glenn, supra note 5, at 769). 
They are drafted in much the same way, as Professor Moréteau has noted, 
“reforming a civil code is like amending a constitution. One may imagine a 
process comparable to a Constitutional convention.” (Moréteau, De 
Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 64). Moreover, as an explanation of the title 
below will lay out, they are both oriented toward the citizens and are meant to be 
understood by the same.  
 20. MICHAEL KAMMEN, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at 
vii (Penguin Books 1986) (citing 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND 
MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 379 (A. P. Sprague ed., New 
York 1884)).  




hindering my endeavor, these objections actually helped to sculpt 
my writing. As such, I will briefly address them here. 
It was argued that since the Constitution deals with public law 
matters and not private law matters it could not be considered a 
“code” like the civil codes of the Enlightenment. This seemed to be 
a troublesome argument. However, upon closer inspection, it fails. 
Codes do not have to deal with one specific area of law. They may 
cover either private law or public law so long as they conform to 
the three requirements above. The Prussian Civil Code has sections 
that deal with what today we would call “public law;”21 drafters of 
both the Austrian and Prussian Codes wanted to put more public 
law into them, which, as noted by another author reaches into what 
is commonly considered Constitutional governance.22 Moreover, 
even some modern codes that have their basis in the three great 
codes have provisions that would seem to deal with public law 
matters, such as Louisiana Civil Code article 671, which states, in 
pertinent part, “[w]hen private property is so destroyed in order to 
combat a conflagration, the owner shall be indemnified by the 
political subdivision for the actual loss.”23  
It was also argued that the Constitution was drafted prior to the 
completion of the three great codes. Therefore, they argued, how 
could the framers have taken the ideas of drafting that the 
Europeans used? I answer that timing is of no import here. I do not 
argue that the framers stole their ideas for drafting broad articles 
from the French, or that specific enumeration was stolen from the 
Austrians or Prussians. These ideas for drafting pre-date all of 
these documents. I argue merely that the same thing occurred. 
Thus, the Constitution is the result of a sort of convergence.24 
                                                                                                             
 21. For Prussian, see Lucke, supra note 9, at 21 (citing to Pt. II, tit. 11, § 1). 
 22. Id. at 21-28. 
 23. This is especially true since, like the Enlightenment codes, the 
Louisiana Code is “natural law based.” Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 
13, at 41. 
 24. Convergent evolution: A process in evolutionary biology where two 
unrelated species develop similar traits in response to similar circumstances.  




Certain characteristics were obtained in response to certain 
conditions (here, the Enlightenment, Natural Law, and Roman law, 
consequent with political and philosophical changes) to achieve a 
certain end (a code serving a particular function). This is not to 
say, however, that the two had no influences on each other.  
C. What this Essay is not Intended to Do  
I do not mean, nor should the contents of this essay in any way 
be taken, to disrespect either of the two systems of law discussed 
herein. I place this disclaimer here due to several experiences I 
have had while at law school. Attending a bijural institution has led 
to several remarks that gave me pause. Some professors advocated 
that Louisiana simply rid itself of the civil law, others remarked, 
“the next time a civilian is kind to the common law will be the first 
time.” This same animosity has reached to students. Some of who 
have uttered phrases such as, “there’s no difference between the 
two systems anymore;” or “Louisiana is a common law state with 
different words.” One may attribute this not infrequent hostility to 
civilian professors “feeling like a minority and [developing] an 
inferiority complex”25 or to common law advancement in 
Louisiana. After all, LSU is the only law school in the state that 
requires civilian training.26 In the end, both the civil law system 
and the common law system have positives and negatives. There 
are strong similarities between the systems; but this may be due to 
the near homogeny of European civilization for centuries. 
Moreover, although it was the civilian thinkers who sought to 
protect “natural rights” for all humankind (they abolished, inter 
alia, slavery and torture),27 it was the common law nations that 
were initially successful in putting this higher law into a practical 
                                                                                                             
 25. Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 33. 
 26. Id. at 51. 
 27. Lucke, supra note 9, at 17. 




form.28 Indeed, the monarchy was still quite strong in both Austria 
and Prussia at the time of the drafting of the codes, but the 
common law was invoked to limit the monarchy in England.29  
Moreover, I do not intend to prove specific civilian/continental 
influence on the Constitution or the American legal system as a 
whole. Such a job has already been done. Much has already been 
written on the subject of civilian theory and the framing 
generation.30 Some have noted that, at times, the framers appealed 
to civilian theory more often than to common law thinkers—even 
Blackstone!31 Others have shown, through extensive research, that 
the civil law was appealed to on private law matters that the 
common law already covered,32 and in American law generally.33 
Indeed, some of the most famous cases in common law property 
were actually civil law based decisions.34 The use of civilian 
theory was even stronger in the area of Constitutional 
adjudication.35 Further still, others have inadvertently noted 
statements by the framers which show vivid knowledge of the civil 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. at 37, (explaining that the American Declaration of Independence 
was recording these ideas while the Europeans were trying to put them into their 
codes); common law courts also acted early in protecting certain rights against 
one’s neighbors; Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of 
American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 170 (1928-1929). 
 29. Corwin, supra note 28, at 183-85. 
 30. Some have set forth that the method of adjudication that was used in the 
founding documents appears more civilian than common law-based—i.e. 
looking for fundamental principles first, then applying them to the facts, rather 
than deriving fundamental principles from the facts. See Jacques Vanderlinden, 
Is the Pre-20th Century American Legal System a Common Law System? An 
Exercise in Legal Taxonomy, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1 (2011).  
 31. Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late 
Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 195 
(1984). 
 32. R.H. Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary American 
Jurisprudence in Symposium: Relationships Among Roman Law, Common Law, 
and Modern Civil Law, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1649, 1679 (1992). 
 33. Id. at 1653. 
 34. Id. at 1664 (citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)). 
 35. Id. at 1671, 1676 (stating “The Constitution of the United States and 
those of the several states were understood in the light of these civilian 
statements of principle.”). 




law, even going so far as to state that writing the Constitution 
down would give it “a usufruct” over the next generation.36  
Finally, I do not mean to deny any and all common law 
influence on the Constitution. However, it is highly important to 
note that the common law was not as sacrosanct to the framing 
generation as the modern Supreme Court opinions would have us 
believe. At times, many were openly hostile to the adoption of the 
common law, and made sure that individuals knew they did not 
adopt it simply by being under English control—and this was two 
years before the colonies declared independence.37 Moreover, 
others were concerned about the political structure that having 
common law courts would bring, to wit it was noted, “To bring the 
common law wholesale would bring ‘a thousand anti-republican 
theories.’”38 Perhaps these hostilities were more directed at the 
source of the common law rather than at the common law itself. 
After all, we declared independence from, and fought a war 
against, the English Monarchy. Is it any surprise that the people 
would be somewhat put off by adopting a legal regime created by 
Crown-appointed judges? In the generation following the framing, 
it was succinctly put. “[W]e are not so strict as [England] in our 
attachment to everything in the Common Law.”39 Finally, one 
should take note that the drafters of the Constitution were not the 
ones who actually gave it power. The people of the United States 
gave it power. As a result, it was not Englishmen alone who 
                                                                                                             
 36. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (citing, 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 116, 121 (P. Ford ed., 1895) (emphasis omitted from original). 
 37. Pound, supra note 5, at 6 (stating, “already in Novaglus (1774) John 
Adams argued against the proposition that the colonists, of legal necessity, had 
brought over English law with them and were bound by it . . .”).  
 38. KAMMEN, supra note 20, at 54 (citing letter from George Washington to 
Alexander Hamilton, July 10, 1787). 
 39. Thomas H. Lee, The Civil Law Tradition in American Constitutionalism 
(citing letter to Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell), Sep. 22, 1828, in 1 LIFE AND 
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 559 (William Story ed., 1851)), available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Lee%20Civil%20
Law%20Tradition%20NYU%20Final%20Draft.pdf. 




ratified it,40 but a people consisting of mainly Continental 
Europeans.41 This idea is reflected through Thomas Paine, who 
once stated, “Europe, and not England, is the parent country of 
America. Not one third of the inhabitants, even of this province 
[Pennsylvania], are of English descent. Wherefore, I reprobate the 
phrase of parent or mother country applied to England only as 
being false, selfish, narrow and ungenerous.”42  
However, one should also note that the framers adored the 
common law when it protected individual rights, hence they often 
invoked the “rights of Englishmen.”43 Moreover, to deny common 
law influence entirely would be an absurd thing to do, as the 
Seventh Amendment clearly cites the “common law.”44  
D. Note on the Title 
In searching for a title to this essay, I knew it must be (1) in 
Latin to reflect the classical legal aspect of this paper, and (2) it 
must reference both systems of law: common and civil. Eventually, 
I came to realize that the selected title, Secundum Civilis, achieved 
this end and also reiterated themes present throughout this writing. 
Taken together the words may mean “through the civilians,” 
“second city,” or “second civilian.” An astute observer would 
realize that it also references two works of law that are 
fundamentally important. The first part denotes what has become 
known as the Corpus Juris Secundum, which is the total body of 
                                                                                                             
 40. As the Preamble of the United States Constitution states, “We the 
people . . .”.  
 41. This achieved what Benjamin Franklin wanted, i.e., having a 
Constitution which would be attractive to Continental Europeans. See Mitchell 
Franklin, Concerning the Influence of Roman Law on the Formulation of the 
Constitution of the United States, 38 TUL. L. REV. 621, 631 [hereinafter 
Concerning the Influence]. 
 42. Id. (citing Paine, Common Sense (1776) in 2 LIFE & WORKS OF THOMAS 
PAINE 93, 127 (William Van der Weyde ed., 1925)). 
 43. Calvin Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 
61 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 56 (Giving examples of the early American invoking the 
“rights of Englishmen”).  
 44. “In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved….” 




law for the United States—a massive compilation of rules of law 
and court decisions.45 The second part denotes the Corpus Juris 
Civilis—the work of, inter alia, Tribonian at the order of Emperor 
Justinian. The CJC, which will be discussed in detail below, served 
as a source of Roman law for centuries.46 One would do well to 
study it.  
Lastly, the interpretation understood as “through the civilian” 
represents a universal theory: law is meant to be understood by the 
citizens.47 This need for citizen understanding of the law, I believe, 
inevitably leads to the position that the citizenry ought to be at the 
center of the law.48 Even those principles of law arising from 
universal reason were understood as needing to be morphed in 
such a way as to be usable by the average person.49 All four 
Enlightenment era codes share such a belief. Thus, the title drives 
home the very heart of this essay—the Constitution is, in all 
essential respects, an Enlightenment code and ought to be 
understood as one.  
II. ARTICLE I: THE ROMAN LAW  
A. The Roman Law and Europe 
What is meant by the term “Roman law” is not a single set of 
statutes or juristic writers, but rather a broad spectrum of law 
ranging from the sixth century B.C. through Cicero, Theodosius, 
                                                                                                             
 45. It is in the context of the CJS, the term “Secundum” denotes the second 
edition. Kendall F. Svengalis, Legal Encyclopedias in LEGAL INFORMATION 
BUYER'S GUIDE & REFERENCE MANUAL 89-90 (Rhode Island Law Press 2010). 
 46. Zepos, supra note 6, at 897 (stating, “the root of that common European 
Spirit lies in the Roman world-empire, the final phase of which is represented by 
the Justinian legislation in the form it took in the sixth century.”).  
 47. The Constitution is meant to be understood by the voters, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576; 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008); Others 
have noted that the Civil Codes are meant to be understood by the citizens. 
WATSON, supra note 14, at 142.  
 48. Professor Moréteau also believes that citizens should be the center of 
the “legal universe,” Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, supra note 13, at 34. 
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and the classical Roman age, then deposited, for the most part, 
within the confines of the Corpus Juris Civilis and protected by the 
Holy Church for a millennium. It is this body of law that has been 
picked apart throughout multiple eras of human kind and 
transplanted into the existing social order. Due to its significance 
in our discussion, a brief history of the Roman law follows, along 
with an explanation of how it entered the great codes and 
ultimately the United States Constitution.  
Out of historical necessity, we begin with the Law of the 
Twelve Tables; indeed, no discussion of legal antiquity could be 
complete without it.50 After the monarchy was eliminated and 
Rome became a fledgling republic, two classes of people existed—
patricians (noble-born) and plebeians (essentially, commoners). 
When a dispute arose between citizens, and the law was not clearly 
on one side or the other, resort was made to the pontiffs, who were 
all patricians. Needless to say, the plebeians did not always receive 
a fair hearing. To resolve the deep mistrust of the plebeians, a 
group of ten citizens, decemviri, were assigned to draft the Twelve 
Tables, which were to extend over all areas of possible contention 
among citizens. Ostensibly, this allowed the plebeians to know 
their rights before they entered court.51 One can see in this concept 
the shaping of the theory that law is meant for the citizens.  
As Rome expanded, the need for new legal devices also grew. 
To alleviate this growing need, pontiffs were able to creatively 
interpret the Twelve Tables via analogy to other provisions therein 
to cover situations not historically provided for. One such event 
concerned emancipation.52 The Twelve Tables had the father as 
head of the household, who held control over his family until 
death. Another provision allowed a father to sell his son into 
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servitude, but if he sold him three times, then the son became 
liberated and was no longer under his father’s control. This gave us 
emancipation, for a father could “sell” his son into servitude three 
times, each time having a friend “return” his son. Thus, the son 
would be freed from his father’s house. Eventually, this concept of 
emancipation was expanded to female children as well. One can 
see in this that the origins of text are only interpretation.  
When the republic expanded well beyond Italy, it began having 
more contact with non-Roman citizens than it ever had before. As 
such, a new, separate law was created for them—ius gentium, 
meaning the law common to all civilizations.53 That which covered 
Roman citizens was called the ius civil. This need to have separate 
laws—and separate praetors for each—would come to an end 
during the classical Roman period, when essentially all residents of 
the empire were made citizens.54  
Finally, we reach the Christian era. During the first two 
centuries of Christianity, the Roman republic saw its most 
prominent legal age yet. Four members of this class deserve 
special attention, as their work and ideas will constantly arise in 
our discussion, and constantly arise in any discussion on Roman 
law. The first is the great teacher of Roman law, Gaius. He was the 
one who divided the civil law in his textbook, The Institutes, into 
three concepts: persons, things, and actions.55 Then there is Ulpian 
and Paul, both of whom are still highly regarded today for their 
ability to synthesize jurisprudence. And finally, there is Papinian, 
who is beloved for his case analysis.  
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The next phase of Roman legal history came with the Codex 
Theodosius, which was said to be a compilation of all laws created 
by the Christian Emperors since Constantine’s religious conversion 
of the empire. However grand this work may be on its own, it pales 
in comparison to that of a later emperor, Justinian.  
Justinian, Emperor of the Eastern Empire in Constantinople, 
looked at the desolation of the West after the German invaders 
conquered the once great civilization. While at the same time 
attempting to wrestle authority away from the Roman Papacy, he 
wanted to restore the magnificence of a unified Empire.56 His 
conquests eventually let him hold Italy for a brief period. But his 
conquests on land would not be his lasting legacy. Like Napoléon 
after him, Justinian’s memory would be preserved more by his 
legal writing than by his military conduct. In the sixth century, 
Justinian appointed a council to combine all the laws of the Empire 
into one massive volume. Headed by Tribonian, the council made 
quick work of their task. In the end, the work was divided into 
three parts: the first is the Institutes, modeled after that of Gaius; 
the second is the Digest, a compilation of writings by great jurists 
such as Paul, Ulpian, and Papinian; the third is the Code, modeled 
after that of Theodosius. Justinian eventually had to add a fourth 
part, called the Novels, a compilation of his own enactments. 
Massive in size and importance, the document is one and a half 
times the size of the Bible, and lasted as the basis of law for 
Romans in Byzantium until the Muslim conquest in 1453.57  
But in the west, the CJC was lost in the sixth century. It would 
not be rediscovered until more than four hundred years later. This 
does not mean that Roman law was entirely lost for that lengthy 
period. The conquerors adopted some provisions of Roman law 
and traces of it can be seen in the Visigoth Code. Moreover, the 
                                                                                                             
 56. Stein, ROMAN LAW, supra note 6, at 32-35 (noting his desire to restore 
the glory of the old Roman Empire). 
 57. Id. (noting the massive size and complexity); see also Zepos, supra note 
6, at 899 (noting that the Muslim conquerors allowed Roman law to continue as 
a basis for enslaved Christians).  




Catholic Church, being the only Roman institution left in the West 
after the fall, helped to preserve many Roman legal customs, most 
notably by the use of its ecclesiastical courts.  
After its rediscovery in Italy, the CJC gave rebirth to the study 
of Roman law. Students from throughout the continent came to 
study it. During this frenzy a number of different groups developed 
inter alia, the commentators and glossators—who sought to 
explain the text. Eventually the glosses were given their own 
books. In time, some sought to defend Roman law on the basis of a 
higher law; others used it as a supplement to their own laws; and it 
became a corner stone in the ecclesiastical courts, which gave it 
almost universal application in Europe. It was studied to some 
degree in England, until those who tried to teach it were exiled. 
Roman law was to have its greatest impact when it filled the void 
left by the Catholic Church following the Reformation. After those 
unfortunately volatile years, a universal system of law seemed 
impossible. But the respect many had for the Roman custom 
allowed it to continue crossing international borders, including 
those of France, Prussia, Austria, and, eventually, to the United 
States.58  
B. The Prussian Code 
Most people are familiar with the saying, “all roads lead to 
Rome.” This section of the essay may be construed as implying, 
“all codes lead to Rome.” Indeed, that body of law, as has been 
noted above, played a pivotal role in the formation of the civil law, 
and it is the adoption of the same that gives the civil law, and the 
codes of the Enlightenment, a unique spirit.59 Given the extreme 
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importance of each code in laying the criteria for what is an 
“Enlightenment code,” it is necessary to show how these codes 
came to be, for it is by the similar political and social processes 
that created them that one may compare them to the United States 
Constitution; this is especially true with Roman law.60  
Therefore, we begin with the Prussian Civil Code. In German, 
its name is Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten 
(ALR), and it was initially begun under the leadership of Frederick 
the Great.61 But did not come into force until his son, Frederick II, 
came to power in 1794. It is said to have dealt with what we call 
today constitutional law,62 civil law, and criminal law.  
When Frederick William I first sought to adopt a code for his 
scattered kingdom in 1714, he looked to the faculty of law at the 
University of Halle, led by Christian Thomasius. His goals were 
not reached. But a little more than two decades later, he arranged 
for Samuel von Cocceji to draft a new law. It is said that unlike 
Thomasius, Cocceji was “a keen Romanist [who] tried to maintain 
the primacy of Roman law.”63 The kingdom was against him, 
though, on this point.  
Part of the reason why the code took so long to be drafted was 
due to Roman law. Initially, the King wanted to remove the 
“Roman law which [was] written in Latin and compiled without 
any order or system.”64 This dream, however, was not realized, as 
the bulk of the draft simply rearranged what had become the ius 
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commune—Roman law changed to fit into each nation. Indeed, by 
the time the whole matter was settled, Roman law was to be 
included where it fit in with everything else.  
One needs not look to the subtext of the code to find Roman 
influences. In Section 30 of the introduction to an earlier draft of 
the code it is stated that the King has not abolished Roman law, but 
has taken out the confusion so that, “consequently, the Roman law 
is reduced into an art and system; that is to say, it is proposed in 
the most natural and proper order….” Moreover, Part I, Book I, 
Title I, Section 10 of that same draft states, “We have indeed taken 
the Roman law for a foundation, in so far as its general principles 
appear to be drawn from natural reason.” The specific intuitions of 
Roman law taken up in the code may be seen in those provisions 
on property.65 Though highly specific, this code managed to last 
until the Code of the German Empire of 1900.  
C. The Austrian Code 
Much like the other Codes discussed within this essay, the 
Austrian Code had a tumultuous gestation period. Holy Roman 
Emperor Charles VI wanted a comprehensive law of intestate 
succession based upon Justinian’s laws (in force from 1727 to 
1747).66 His successor to the empire, Maria Teresa, issued an order 
in 1753 to draft a code, which was to cover all of private law (as 
opposed to the Prussian code, which wanted to also cover public 
law). This Codex Theresianus was finished in 1766, and was a 
compromise of Roman law and customary law. Although written 
in the vernacular, the code spanned 8,367 articles and was grouped 
based on Roman law categories. This code was met with fierce 
public opposition as it removed too much power from the nobles, 
and was viewed by reformers as not being drastic enough.  
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A student of the great natural law thinker Martini, a man by the 
name of Johann Bernhard Horten, was hired to draft a new, shorter 
code. The code under the new emperor, Joseph II, went into force 
in 1787. The work of the previous commission was then thrown 
out and a new commission was ordered. This time, Martini was 
placed at its head (as he had been for the first draft of the Codex 
Theresianus). The code was eventually given actual force in 1811, 
some sixty years after the Codex was begun.  
But Martini’s effect upon the Code is felt in both Natural law 
and Roman law. For it is by his natural law work that the Roman 
law was allowed into both his code and the later final drafts.67 He 
argued that Roman law was not bad, but was indeed reasonable: 
“Roman civil law consists to the greatest extent of natural laws. It 
is impossible to avoid all error if its shortcomings are complements 
according to the precepts of natural law and its dark passages 
illuminated.”68 One may see the primary effect of Roman law in 
this code in the notion that the private civil law made no distinction 
of social or economic status between freemen. One may also see 
the Roman law influence on the notion of suretyship.69  
In the end, Franz von Zeiller replaced Martini as head of the 
commission on drafting. His work is said to be a practical 
compromise between Roman law and the contemporary law. This 
shortened draft (1,502 articles) has remained in force to the present 
day, with some amendments occurring in 1914, 1915, and 1916 
and was given the name of Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch—
ABGB).70 One may view the document as a testament to the 
longevity and universality of both the Roman law and of the codes. 
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D. The Code Civil 
Aside from the United States Constitution, few legal 
documents have ever had the global impact of the Napoleonic 
Code. Its theories and order were followed by codifiers in 
Louisiana,71 Italy, Latin America, and Canada (to name only a 
few)—not to mention throughout central Europe as a consequence 
of Napoleon’s wars. 
Codification as such was nothing new in France. Indeed, 
centuries prior to the Revolution, King Charles VII had ordered 
that the customs of France be written down, which resulted in a 
codified and uncodified system. After the Revolution, however, the 
need for a comprehensive code on private law was more than 
obvious. The Revolutionary government had continuously 
promised such, but it had always failed to deliver it. In fact, the 
first three drafts of the code, written by Jean-Jacques Régis de 
Cambacérès, were all rejected for one reason or another.  
However, when Napoléon became first consul, he envisioned a 
code covering all private law, and wanted it completed quickly and 
perfectly. To achieve this end, he appointed Jean Étienne Portalis 
and three jurists to head the Commission of 1800. To be sure, the 
prior attempts at codification were very useful to their endeavors. 
Moreover, the Commission was able to look to eighteenth century 
writers such as Domat and Pothier, and quoted them frequently.  
In this manner Roman law was able to influence the French 
code. Both Domat and Pothier summarized the law that was in 
force in France at that time, which was itself heavily Roman. Even 
more importantly, Pothier had already done much of the primary 
work needed to draft a code. He had collected and organized the 
Roman law into a “rational and usable order,”72 and then divided 
the generally applicable laws gleaned from there into five 
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categories: general rules, persons, things, actions, and public law. 
The rules on public law were left out of the Code civil. But Pothier 
was not solely a Roman scholar. He was also very familiar with 
French customary law, and was able to weave Roman law and 
custom together.  
It is said that the Roman rules of law predominate the Code 
civil,73 which is still in force (with some amendments) today. One 
example of Roman private law can be seen in the notion of lesion: 
in article 1118, lesion vitiates certain kinds of contracts; then 
article 1674 allows parties with full legal capacity to gain 
rescission of a contract where he has been injured by selling his 
property for less than seven-twelfths of the value of his immovable 
property. Moreover, the concept of good faith, which can be seen 
in all three of the great codes, stems from the Roman law of bona 
fides.74 So, too, is the concept of favoring the debtor over the 
creditor derived from the Roman rule of wanting to protect the 
weak from the strong. Lastly, the distinctions between ownership 
and possession in the codes were, and continue to be in all civilian 
states, the Roman rule.75  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 73. Others have noted the massive influence of Roman Law on the Code 
civil. See J.L. HALPERIN, THE CIVIL CODE 69 (David Gruning trans., 2001) 
(stating, “Roman law was also invoked as the source for the Code’s rules on 
successions and property.”). See also Olivier Moréteau, Recodification in 
Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1146 (2008-2009) (noting 
the “radical unity of the European law that found its grounding in Roman law.”).  
 74. See WATSON, supra note 14, at 166 (noting the Roman lesion concept in 
the codes). See Zepos, supra note 6, at 904 (noting that it is from this notion that 
the concept of abuse of right is derived. This rule of law is present in all civilian 
jurisdictions even where no provision for it exists.).  
 75. To be fair, several provisions of the codes do not derive from the 
Roman rules directly and are, in fact, responses to the Roman understanding. 
See Zepos, supra note 6, at 903-904. 




E. The Roman Law and the United States Constitution76 
The framing generation had a wealth of sources pertaining to 
the Roman law.77 This included, inter alia, numerous copies of 
Justinian’s legal temple, the Corpus Juris Civilis—both translated 
into English and retained in Latin. They were taught in the 
classical style, and knew a great deal about Roman public law and 
its history.78 It is indisputable that the same people who declared 
independence and drafted the American Constitution at 
Philadelphia both admired, to the point of nearly worshiping, the 
ancient republic, and wished to learn from its mistakes.79 Their 
professors were civilians, their friends across the pond were 
civilians; and these civilians were all trained in the Roman law.80 
With this brief interlude in mind, we continue forth with 
ascertaining just how the late republic touched out national code.  
1. Article I, Sections 1 & 3 
What may at first seem to be a superficial connection to 
antiquity, may also be the most profound Roman influence on the 
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Constitution. It is well established that the framers looked to the 
Roman notion of public power as a guide as to how the same 
power ought to be handled.81 Indeed, perhaps one of the most 
famous comments to come from Rome seems to be reflected in our 
triune federal structure. In discussing the separation of 
governmental power into three parts, Polybius writes: 
For when one part having grown out of proportion to the 
others aims at supremacy and tends to become too 
predominate, it is evident that, as for the reasons above 
given none of the three is absolute, but the purpose of the 
one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others, none 
of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them 
with contempt. 82 
Besides this separation of powers there is yet another structural 
connection to the ancient regime. It is this structural feature that 
bears a more pronounced Roman influence than the three-part 
separation of power. That feature is, of course, the Senate. Article 
I, Section 1 creates the Senate: “All legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Section 3 
further delineates the powers and functions of the body. Of 
particular note are a higher age requirement, a longer term, and a 
larger constituency than the House.  
As any student of history should know this separation of 
legislative power was the result of the Great Compromise. Some 
delegates wished to have Congressional representation based upon 
statehood, and thus a set number of representatives per state. 
Others wanted Congressional representation to be based upon 
population. The solution to this crisis: split the difference. Thus, 
the bicameral legislature was born in the United States. 
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The body, as it exists in this nation, is undoubtedly based on 
the Roman constitutional scheme. The term “Senate” derives from 
the Latin Senatus, which means “council of elders.” If the framing 
generation had not wanted to base its conception upon the Roman 
system, it could have named the body anything else. Examples of 
such are “upper house” or “chamber.” Moreover, the type of 
reverence for this body, as opposed to other contemporary 
legislatures, is almost identical. The Romans looked to their 
council as a higher office; its members were allowed to wear 
purple sashes and make binding legislation. The same body has 
been charged with being “made up of the wisest, the best educated, 
the most respected, most experienced, most vigilant, most patriotic 
men of substance in the Roman republic.”83 In much the same way, 
it is well known that the American Senate was designed to be more 
prestigious and deliberative than the House of Representatives. 
2. Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 
The Constitution provides in this section, “The privilege of the 
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”84 
In reviewing ancient influences on the American Constitution, it 
has been explained that, “[a] Roman citizen’s right of provocatio, 
coupled with the tribunitial power of auxilium, was an ancient 
analogue of habeas corpus. Additionally, the exigent circumstances 
for the suspension of habeas corpus closely mirror those for the 
derogation of provocatio and auxilium.”85 Although one may see 
correlation to the British model of habeas corpus, one should also 
realize that there exists a concept of habeas corpus that is not the 
sole concept of the clause at issue. Rather, it also provides under 
what circumstances the writ may be suspended. This method is in 
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stark contrast to the way the writ was suspended by the English. 
On that point, it has been noted, “[i]t is important to realize, 
however, that British law was rather less helpful to the Framing 
Generation in explaining the specific conditions or timing for the 
suspensions of habeas corpus.”86 The English version was “less 
helpful” because the Parliament suspended habeas corpus only 
against a “limited class of persons declared to be treasonous or in 
rebellion against the Crown and were essentially bills of attainder, 
a form of legislation proscribed by the United States 
Constitution.”87  
If the item known as the “suspension clause” were to be 
thought of as referring to the British model of habeas corpus, then 
it would simply mean “bills of attainder.” But if the term 
contemplates bills of attainder, then we would be forced into a 
terrible position—the Constitution would have superfluity. For if 
the habeas corpus clause means “bills of attainder,” then the clause 
that follows the suspension clause is superfluous. For that clause 
states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed.”88 The only way to avoid this superfluity is to suggest that 
the second clause overrules the first, but seeing that they were 
passed at the same time, this seems highly unlikely.  
Lastly, it should be mentioned that throughout the ratifying era, 
in the State conventions, and in the Philadelphia convention, 
extensive attention was paid to the Roman republican use of 
temporary dictators in times of emergency.89 When these dictators 
were declared, periods of time were set for the suspension of the 
aforementioned provocatio and auxilium.90 Thus, the ratifying 
states certainly contemplated the clause as referring to the Roman 
legal concept. But one must be aware that both clauses are in the 
portion of the Constitution placing limits on Congressional power. 
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Thus, the Roman influence is not only one of giving an example of 
a necessary power, but in giving a lesson of what ought not be 
done. A student of history would recall that the last Roman dictator 
never gave up power.  
3. Article IV, Section 4 
The Constitution states, “The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and 
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of 
the Legislature, or if the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic violence.”91 Few scholars have 
expounded on this text and courts have essentially overlooked it. 
And the American people have forgotten its meaning over time. 
But this section suggests something rather amazing. If it had been 
understood in a Roman law light, then: (1) The fourteenth 
amendment could have been accomplished by legislation, and (2) 
much of what was accomplished by an expanded commerce power 
could have been achieved by a Romanist-construed Guarantee 
clause. But those specific results are beyond the scope of this 
section of my essay. They will, however, be alluded to in what 
follows.  
There was, in Roman public law, a concept of intercessio, 
whereby the plebeian tribunes could agree or veto acts passed by 
the patricians, when those actions had effect upon the plebeians.92 
The main historical connection to the Roman doctrine can be found 
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in writings between the French Romanist, Abbé de Mably, who 
was a very dear friend of both Adams and Jefferson, and whose 
works were read by Benjamin Franklin. On the issue of 
intercession against the States, Mably wrote to Adams: 
With you, the authority of the Congress must supply the 
place of triunes, provided you give to this assembly the 
form and credit which it ought to hold. The rich, when they 
perceived a body empowered to sit in judgment upon their 
actions, would prove guarded in their enterprises; and the 
people would, certainly, feel less disquiet and suspicious…. 
[E]ither the hope of fear of a juridical decision would calm 
the raging of sedition in America.93 
Thus, it is said that Mably “gave the Continental Congress the 
power of interposition against anti-democratic state 
governments.”94 Madison apparently took up this idea and, in 
Federalist Paper 43, described it as creating the power of 
“interposition of the general government.” That this intercessio 
was taken from Mably and ordered upon the United States 
Constitution is further shown by Madison’ writings to Jefferson. 
There Madison reveals his worries about state power in saying, “a 
check on the States appears to me necessary . . . . Without such a 
check in the whole over the parts, our system involves the evil of 
imperia in imperio.”95  
In discovering this connection, Professor Franklin noted: 
In suggesting that the national government was capable of 
objective judgment concerning the genuineness of the 
republicanism of the states, Madison was following Mably. 
As has been shown [Mably] had proposed to John Adams 
that the Romanist interpositional or tribunitional power [as 
was named above as intercession] be given exclusively to 
the Continental Congress, because it would exercise its 
authority in accordance with legal method.96  
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To further drive home the Roman law influence on this portion 
of the Constitution, it is interesting to note that the Guarantee 
clause may have no English origin.97 
It is a sad gloss on history that the Southern States used 
“interposition” to protect their racist proclivities for decades, while 
the true power of interposition actually rested in the hands of the 
federal Congress.  
4. The Fifth Amendment and Infamy 
The Constitution provides that “No person shall be held to 
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crimes . . . nor be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”98 
The understanding of that clause, today, is that a person cannot be 
forced to testify against himself on any matter that may eventually 
lead him to criminal liability. However, when this clause is 
understood in light of its Roman origin, it actually means that a 
person cannot be forced to testify at all in a criminal trial, when 
doing so may “infame” him.  
Infamy stems from Roman feudal infamy.99 This concept 
essentially causes a person to be ostracized by the community. The 
person, whether or not convicted of a crime or found liable for 
some action, could be deemed “civilly unworthy,” dishonored, or 
disgraced. The general term for this concept when translated into 
English is “infamy.”100 From Rome, the concept was carried over 
into feudal Europe, under the guise of religious 
infamy/excommunication. John Calvin kept infamy/excommuni-
cation after Luther attempted to abolish it. The Puritans carried the 
concept with them to the New World, until it was abolished by 
popular demand as being “undemocratic.” Montesquieu wrote 
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about infamy as being one of the most ruinous things that could 
happen to a person.101 A French Encyclopédisme idol, Cesare 
Beccaria,102 helped to develop and secularize Luther’s attack on 
infamy. Jefferson and Edward Livingston are both known to have 
studied Beccaria in detail. It is from these men and their roles in 
the founding generation that infamy was brought into the Fifth 
Amendment.103  
Because informing, or testifying against one’s neighbors and 
friends, may create just the type of infamy that was present in 
feudal Europe and ancient Rome, the Fifth Amendment must 
necessarily be understood as a right of any witness to refrain from 
testifying, even if it would not incriminate him for the crime 
charged or any future charges. Thus, self-incrimination should 
properly be understood as “self-infamy.” A dissenting Justice of 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized this point.104  
It is important to note that the concept of “infamy” mentioned 
in the Constitution, “[never] enjoy[ed] any real important role as 
such in [the] history of English Criminal law, perhaps because it 
was excluded or held down by Magna Carta.”105 Therefore, the 
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most potent source of “infamy” is that which stems from the 
Roman law and not any that is present in the English law.  
5. The Fifth Amendment and Double Jeopardy 
On this point the Fifth Amendment declares, “nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb.”106 Popularly called the Double Jeopardy clause, 
the Roman roots of this clause have long been established. In 
Justice Black’s dissent in Bartkus v. Illinois,107 it was stated, “Fear 
and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the 
same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in Western 
civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman times.”108 To 
prove this point, the Justice makes reference to Justinian’s Digest, 
which states, as translated by Scott, “The governor should not 
permit the same person to be again accused of a crime of which he 
has been acquitted.”109  
But Justice Black is not alone in finding the source of double 
jeopardy in antiquity. The same connection was made by Professor 
Paul Baier of LSU, who upon finding the connection stated, 
“[w]ho would have thought that certain of our Constitutional 
protections have come down to us from Rome?”110 Indeed, even 
other clauses, such as the right of confrontation expressed in the 
Sixth Amendment111 have roots in Roman legal practice.112  
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6. The Ninth Amendment and the Roman Legal Method 
As one will come to know upon completion of this essay, I 
believe that the Ninth Amendment ought to be considered the most 
robust Amendment of them all.113 Indeed, I believe that it (1) 
orders that the Roman method of analogical reasoning be used to 
interpret the Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights; (2) houses 
the natural law of the Enlightenment; and (3) should bring under 
its umbrella almost the entirety of substantive due process, while 
incorporating all that against the states, not via the Due Process 
clause, but via the Privileges or Immunities clause. However, this 
section of the essay aims only to show how the Roman legal 
method can be seen in the Ninth Amendment.  
To briefly summarize the argument, the Ninth Amendment 
declares, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”114 The most important fact about this Amendment is that 
it says “the Constitution.” It does not say “these last eight 
Amendments.” Thus, it refers to every right listed in the 
Constitution. Moreover, one must read this clause from the 
negative to see its ordering of the Roman method. Because we are 
not allowed to use the listing of rights to deny any unwritten rights, 
we must use the listing to discover these unwritten rights protected 
by the Ninth Amendment.  
The Civilian legal method is laid out in detail in the Louisiana 
Civil Code.115 Moreover, when there is a problem that is 
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“historically novel,”116 the Roman method orders that one make 
analogy, not to prior cases to develop the law, but to other 
provisions of the law. This method is usually summarized as “au-
delà du Code civil mais par le Code civil.”117 This is the opposite 
of the common law method, which has at its helm the development 
of law by analogical reasoning from prior cases. An example of 
this can be seen above with the note on Roman emancipation. 
Essentially, this method locates multiple provisions of the written 
law, discovers their principles, and fashions a new rule implicit 
therefrom. I am not the first person to notice that the Ninth 
Amendment requires the civilian method be used in interpreting 
the Constitution.118 Indeed, the Supreme Court has used it even as 
late as the twentieth century.119  
 
                                                                                                             
 
Article 10: When the language of the law is susceptible of different 
meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best 
conforms to the purpose of the law.  
Article 11: The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing 
meaning. 
Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning 
when the law involves a technical matter.  
Article 12: When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning 
must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the 
text of the law as a whole.  
Article 13: Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in 
reference to each other.  
 116. Mitchell Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and Its 
Implications for Republican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 40 TUL. L. REV. 487-88 (1965-1966) [hereinafter 
The Ninth Amendment]. 
 117. Raymond Saleilles, Preface to FRANÇOIS GENY, SCIENCE ET 
TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (1913). (“Beyond the Civil Code, 
but through the Civil Code.” This is essentially the method that was used by 
Justice Goldberg in discussing the Ninth Amendment in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)).  
 118. Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 116. 
 119. Id. (Generally discussing this method as used in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965)).  




III. ARTICLE II: THE NATURAL LAW120 
There are few concepts that have caused as much debate and 
misunderstanding as natural law.121 It has, as Aristotle suggested, 
been appealed to when one had no chance with the law of the 
land.122 It has been argued as the basis for adopting the Roman 
law,123 and has been supported on the notion of law originating 
from the Bible. As such, it has gone by many names: The law of 
nature, the law of God, the natural law, the law of reason. Its 
existence or non-existence would either mean that positive law was 
subordinate to another law, not crafted by human hands; or, 
provided it doesn’t exist, would lead human beings to a sort of 
legal nihilism known as “positivism.” Grounds for locating its 
principles have been argued on both an ontological and 
teleological basis—often arriving at the same conclusion. Others 
dismiss it as merely looking up into the clouds and discovering an 
answer.124  
However, by the time it appeared in the American Constitution, 
natural law had taken on a whole new model completely separate 
from its theological roots, although owing a great deal to the 
same.125 The Enlightenment had secularized it and changed the 
focus from “natural law” to “natural rights.”126 Although in 
Catholic Spain, the idea of natural law still had not yet taken on the 
“individualist” approach of the other European states. Moreover, 
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 123. See text accompanying note 60.  
 124. Or, as some have erroneously put it, “you can invoke natural law to 
support anything you want.” ELY, supra note 36, at 50. 
 125. Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the Natural Law Jurisprudence of Justice 
Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT U. L. REV. 33, 41 (1997) (discussing natural law in 
the context of law of reason and religion); see also Corwin, supra note 28, at 
153 (discussing natural law as being from God); see also Lucke, supra note 9, at 
10 (noting the transformation of the religious law of nature to the secular 
version). 
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the concept of natural law as obtained in England by that point was 
not the same theory as what was coming of age on the continent.127 
In England, the theory of natural law in the common law was not 
“universal reason” but “artificial reason.”128 However, in practice, 
one could see that these two concepts were ultimately arriving at 
similar conclusions. Therefore, we will not take pains to separate 
which concepts derived from which place, because ultimately they 
are the same thing—a law higher than mere positive legislation. 
A. The Natural Law and the Code of Prussia 
The Prussian Code may well be called a “constitution for civil 
society,”129 whose drafters saw no “insurmountable contradiction 
between positive law and natural law.”130 Indeed, they brought 
them together under one roof in a way that could scarcely be 
imagined today: a world where legal positivism apparently rules 
and natural law gets laughed at.131 But at the time of the Prussian 
Code’s debate and existence, natural law was considered to be the 
one true law, a law that no one dared to laugh at.  
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The influence of natural law on the Prussian Code can be seen 
in both its effects upon those who controlled its drafting and in the 
document itself. For example, the leading force for what ultimately 
became the code was Frederick II.132 He, in turn, was a great 
student of Voltaire and shared many of the same views: “religious 
freedom, the abolition of literary censorship and of slavery, [and] 
freedom of trade . . . .”133 Moreover, other forces such as Suarez, 
who was to draft the final version of the code, was a great natural 
law student of Pufendorf. Indeed, the entire structure of the code is 
based on Pufendorf’s understanding of how the law should be.134 
Such influences do not even begin to cover the love the King had 
for Montesquieu, in fact the only idea of Montesquieu that seems 
to have been wholly rejected by the King in the ALR was the 
notion of separation of powers.135 
When time came to actually write a code, Frederick turned to 
Samuel von Cocceji, in 1746, ordering him to “draw up a legal 
code based solely upon reason and the constitutions of the 
provinces.”136 Owing to wars and aristocratic opposition, work did 
not resume on the code until the late 1770’s.137 
Finally, we move to the text of the code and its initial draft to 
show what influence the natural law may have had. In 
Introduction, Section 1 of an earlier draft of the ALR, it is stated, 
“Roman law, being founded on natural equity, and the principles of 
sound reason, it is not surprising that the Christians have made it 
preferable to any other.” Moreover, the code tells us, “Our chief 
attention was to lay down the most natural principles”138 and that 
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the law’s “end is justice which consists in giving everyone his 
own.”139  
Further, the king began to adopt wholesale central doctrines of 
the Enlightenment natural law, most notably equality before the 
law.140 In fact, the King brought his former order (that judges must 
apply natural equity without regard to person or statute) and 
transplanted it into his own introduction to the Code as Section 22, 
which states, “The laws of the state bind all its members, 
regardless of status, rank or gender.”141 Other Enlightenment 
notions, such as neutrality of government towards religion, were 
brought into the Code, as Lucke observes: 
The beliefs residents of the state hold of God and of things 
divine, their faith, and their internal worship, cannot be 
made the subject of strict laws. Every resident in the state is 
entitled to unqualified freedom of faith and conscience. 
Neither churches nor their parishioners are allowed to 
persecute or insult other churches or their parishioners.142 
Still further, the Enlightenment notion that property is an 
inherent right in being human is strongly apparent in the code. For 
Introduction, Section 75 orders, “The State is obliged to 
compensate a person who is forced to sacrifice his particular rights 
and advantages in the interest of the public welfare.” These 
property rights are protected further in the code as well: “the state 
may force a person to sell his property only if the public welfare 
requires it.”143  
Finally, there is one portion of the code that reflects a 
quintessential Enlightenment natural law theory that would not be 
recognized in our own nation’s Constitution144 until the end of the 
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Civil War145—slavery is in violation of the natural law. Part II, 
Title 5, sections 196 & 197146 prohibit slavery in Prussia and 
prohibited anyone under its control form owning slaves. This rule 
flows necessarily from what is said in Part I, Title 3, Sections 26 & 
27, “No one may force another to act or limit another’s freedom in 
some other way without a special legal justification for doing so. 
No one may force another to refrain from certain conduct only on 
the ground that the conduct would be harmful to the other.”147  
B. The Austrian Civil Code 
The Austrian Code is without a doubt one of the great natural 
law codes of Europe.148 To this end, one may see the natural law 
influences, like in all the codes studied in this essay, in both those 
people who influence it and in the written words that ultimately 
occupied its pages.  
The influence on the code, drafted under Joseph II and Leopold 
II, began early in both of these ruler’s lives. Co-Empress of the 
Holy Roman Empire, Maria Theresa, had her children taught in the 
natural law by the most prominent thinker in the kingdom, Anton 
von Martini. After Joseph II came to power upon his father’s 
death, and received true political power after his mother’s passing, 
he openly opposed torture, and reserved the death penalty for only 
the most serious offenses.149 He supported what some may call a 
due process rule by “defend[ing] the integrity of the ordinary 
courts.”150 By 1776, the emperor had banned torture and soon 
thereafter ended the death penalty. It is even more important to 
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note that based on his understanding of Enlightenment natural law, 
the Emperor allowed for a freedom of conscience much like that of 
Prussia, and sought to end censorship for the most part.151 
The many drafts of the Austrian code shed light on the massive 
influence of natural law on the final version. It has been noted that 
the commission called to write the Code for Maria Theresa was 
instructed to write a code based simply on “the rules of reason and 
natural law,” and that the draft resulting from the order provided, 
“the state of liberty is given to all men by nature” and “liberty is a 
natural faculty to do what one chooses unless restricted by force of 
law.”152 After Francis II succeeded his brother Leopold II (who 
had succeeded Joseph II), he turned away Martini’s draft of a new 
code, and subjected it to more revision, with one of his own 
students heading the project.  
However, Martini’s ideas did survive as an official code in 
other provinces (Eastern and Western Galicia). This code came 
into force when the main Austrian Code was still in the drafting 
stage. This draft became known as Martini’s “principles of public 
order” and are said to have “constitute[d] the philosophy of the 
natural lawyers in a nutshell. They also show[ed] their political 
timidity when faced with the power of monarchy.”153 Of particular 
note for our purposes are the following provisions: 
“Law” has two meaning: one is the rule which prescribes 
lawful conduct, the other the natural freedom or the 
permission to act which everyone has if he fits his conduct 
into the framework of the rules (§3). Rights and duties 
either flow from human nature in which case they are 
called natural or inborn rights and duties, or they are based 
on a particular society in which case they are called 
positive rights and duties, i.e., those which have arisen by 
virtue of the life of the society. (§4) . . . This ultimate goal 
is the general welfare of the state, i.e., personal safety, 
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property and all the other rights of its members. (§7)154 
As noted above, the Austrian Code was not finished until sixty 
years after the Empress had begun its creation. The final version of 
the code did not contain most of the rules on public order. 
However, the final draft does have a provision that, as will be 
shown shortly, correlates heavily to the Ninth Amendment. Section 
7 of the final version states: 
If a case cannot be decided by applying the words or the 
natural meaning of a statute, one must take into 
consideration similar cases which are dealt with in other 
statutes in a definite manner and the reason behind such 
statutes, if doubt remains, the case must be decided by 
applying natural legal principles, having given mature 
consideration to the carefully gathered circumstances. 
C. The Code Civil 
In his address to the French assembly, Portalis openly 
announced his natural law influences for the entire world to 
recognize:  
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Law is universal reason, supreme reason based on the very 
nature of things. Legislation is, or ought to only be, law 
reduced to positive rules, to specific precepts . . . reason, as 
it governs all men for all time, is called natural law . . . that 
which is not contrary to the laws is lawful . . . the judiciary, 
established to apply laws, needs to be guided in this 
application by certain rules. We have outlined them. They 
are such that the private reason of no man can prevail over 
the law, which embodies public reason.155 
Moreover, in his draft of the code, Portalis had written, “There 
exists a natural and immutable law, the source of all positive 
legislation: it is nothing but natural reason, in so far as it governs 
all men.”156 
What is even more important for the purposes of this paper is 
to whom the code was being addressed. The drafters were likely 
not as focused on the outcome of the code as they were with who 
was going to be reading it—Napoléon. Like all great leaders of his 
time, Napoléon was a natural law thinker, even if there is some 
disagreement as to the degree to which he accepted the more 
theoretical side of the movement. He is said to have been an 
admirer of King Frederick the Great (the ruler responsible for the 
Prussian Code) and of Rousseau.157 And he opposed cruel and 
unusual punishment in the form of torture. Indeed, the French 
Code civil adopted the Revolution’s and the Enlightenment’s rally 
cry: liberty, equality and brotherhood.158 It abolished classes and 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. at 31; also a person schooled in the natural law will be able to see the 
influence of Domat in these statements. Others have noted the natural law 
influence on the Code civil as well. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 69 (stating 
“Despite the silences and even denials of the drafters, the Code cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the contribution of [] the natural law 
thinkers….”).  
 156. PROJET DE CODE CIVIL, PRESENTE PAR LA COMMISSION NOMMEE PAR LE 
GOUVERNEMENT, LE 24 THERMIDOR AN VIII (1801), Preliminary Book of Law 
and Legislation, tit. I, art. I (Special thank you to Professor John Randall Trahan 
for the translation).  
It should be noted, however that this provision was ultimately left out of the 
Code civil, but did manage to appear in the Louisiana Digest of 1808 and in 
Civil Code art. 21, which is now art. 4 in the current Code.  
 157. Lucke, supra note 9, at 30.  
 158. Id. at 33. 




privileges pertaining to the private law, and thus achieved 
(ostensibly) the foundation of the natural law—equality in the 
law.159 
Moreover, the Code civil was destined to essentially achieve 
the second most profound theory of the natural law era. This theory 
that natural law is universal and that such universal principles are 
“capable of extension beyond European societies”160 needs only be 
adjusted to fit into the society in which they do their work, which 
was closely linked to Grotius’ understanding of international law. 
Owing to Napoléon’s military and political power, and the sheer 
acceptability of the Code civil, a number of other countries have 
been greatly affected by the French Code civil.161 Natural law 
became a basis for several areas of the code, such as obligations—
being the means by which individuals transferred property and that 
whatever harm one causes by his fault, he is required to repair it.162 
D. The Natural Law and The Constitution163 
The Constitution itself is teeming with the natural law, so much 
so that one would be justified in suggesting that not only has it 
embraced the natural law, but also that it has become the natural 
law. By this I mean to suggest that the saying “an unjust law is no 
law at all” has become “an unconstitutional law is no law at all.”164 
Such a transformation is not unreasonable. After all, the framing 
                                                                                                             
 159. HALPERIN, supra note 73, at 70 (stating that the [code] “is imprinted 
with the Revolutionary principle of equality before the law.”). 
 160. Glenn, supra note 5, at 766. 
 161. Belgium, Luxemburg, Monaco, Italy, Romania, Portugal, Spain, 
Louisiana, Québec, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Japan, China, Turkey, 
Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. Lucke, supra note 9, at 34.  
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influences on the Constitution than is appropriate or possible here. Kennedy, 
supra note 125, at 41; Corwin, supra note 28; Robert P. George, The Natural 
Law Due Process Philosophy, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2000-2001); Robert 
P. George, Natural Law and the Constitution Revisited, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
273 (2001-2002); Massey, supra note 43. 
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generation viewed constitutions as statements of general rules of 
law that were meant to extend continuously forward165 (just like 
the other Enlightenment codes). This is not to mention the fact that 
the framers themselves were brought up and educated in the 
heyday of the natural law/natural rights movement. This movement 
stressed identifying broad generally applicable rules of law. Thus, 
this section of the essay must examine exactly how the 
Constitution reflects the higher law.  
1. The Designation of Rights in the Declaration of 
Independence 
Perhaps no document better reflects the framer’s understanding 
of natural law based rights than the Declaration of Independence. 
For in that document, it is clearly laid out that human rights do not 
come from governments, whether democratic or tyrannical, but are 
inborn in human beings as of their own existence, by God and by 
the natural law. This means that even though the framers took 
provisions of the English Bill of Rights for inspiration on their 
drafting of the Constitution, they certainly did not mean to create 
English control over them. That the beliefs announced in 
Declaration are natural law based is apparent from its very 
opening:  
[A]nd to assume among the powers of the earth, the 
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and 
of Nature’s God entitle them …We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of 
Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers form the 
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consent of the governed . . . .166 
The blanket statement of the laws of nature, coupled with the 
teleological idea of government, and the overarching equality, and 
respect for Life, Liberty, and Property, are all hallmarks of the 
natural law. It is important to note that there is no mention of the 
“Rights of Englishmen.” Therefore, the understanding of natural 
law as announced by the Declaration is not the English common 
law notion of “artificial reason” (the notion that the rights of 
Englishmen could be built in part on custom), but rather that ALL 
people have inborn rights. This gives credit to what was said 
above: the framers adored the common law, when it protected 
human rights, but not always. It is therefore sad that the framers 
did not embrace the ban on slavery right away. The realization of 
that fundamental law would only be established by our 
Constitution after the Civil War (1861-1865).167  
2. The Structure of our Federal Government is Born out of the 
Natural Law 
The vast majority of Americans can recall that the federal 
government has three branches: The Congress, created by Article I 
of the Constitution; the Executive, created by Article II, and the 
Judiciary, created by Article III. This entire structure was created 
to help protect natural law-based rights.168  
The framing era had taken the broad “natural law” and turned it 
into a sweeping “natural rights” movement. From this 
transformation, the idea obtained is that the entire purpose of 
                                                                                                             
 166. Numerous others have pointed out the connection between the natural 
law of both the Church and of the secular Enlightenment, and the Declaration. 
See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 43. 
 167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 168. By this statement, I suggest that because Montesquieu, an 
Enlightenment thinker, wanted to establish a better regime to protect human 
rights, it follows that a three-part separation of powers is intended to protect 
natural law-based rights. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAWS (1748).  




government was to secure the rights of one’s people,169 as is 
evident from the above quoted Declaration. Thus, many theories 
were proffered as to how to best protect one’s people from an 
overreaching government. To answer this, Montesquieu developed 
his three separate, yet equal, branches of government. And instead 
of just having three separate departments of government that could 
check each other, he theorized that governmental power should be 
separate and distinct. Thus, he devised that the Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial powers should be distinct. This separation 
was thought to be a way of protecting the natural rights of citizens. 
It is now widely accepted that the framers looked to Montesquieu 
and borrowed his ideas.170 Thus, the natural law touched our 
federal Constitution by inspiring the way it divided power. 
3. The Natural Law and the Bill of Rights171 
It has been shown that the framing generation believed in a 
certain set of natural law principles that became evident in their 
writing of the Bill of Rights: (1) The rights revealed by natural 
law, including all rights under the rubric of the right to self-
preservation; (2) the right to property (3) freedom of conscience; 
(4) freedom of communication; (5) freedom from arbitrary laws; 
(6) the rights of assembly and petition; and (7) the right to self-
government.172 One may see in these concepts both cognates to 
                                                                                                             
 169. See Cueto-Rua, supra note 4, at 650 (noting that the Enlightenment idea 
was that the sole justification for the existence of government was the protection 
of individual rights). 
 170. Mitchell Franklin has pointed out that the Constitution as written in 
Philadelphia may properly be called, “the Montesquieian constitution, because 
its primary conception was the separation of powers.” See Franklin, The 
Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment to the Third 
Constitution, 4 HOWARD L.J. 170 (1958) [hereinafter Relation of the Fifth]; see 
also Gummere, supra note 78, at 7. 
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what has been said of the Enlightenment natural law codes and to 
what appears in our Constitution. Further, it has been stated that 
“[w]hile there is no textual ground on which one can conclude that 
the Constitution incorporates the whole of the natural law, certain 
passages indisputably attach to object right.”173 Hence they 
connect to a natural law. A summarized and systematized 
explanation of these connections could be as follows: 
(1) That there is a right to preserve one’s self, and that this 
right is protected under the Constitution is evident in the Second 
Amendment,174 which has been declared to possess at its core a 
right to self-defense.175 Moreover, even if one could interpret the 
Second Amendment to not protect a right to self-defense, this does 
not mean that the Constitution would not. For the Ninth 
Amendment tells us that other rights exist which the Constitution 
equally protects, one of which may be the right to self-defense. 
Others have pointed out the natural law influence on the Second 
Amendment.176 
(2) That there is a right to own property and that this right is 
somehow derived from nature without any intervention by 
government is evident in a number of places. But most 
importantly, it is evidenced in the Fifth Amendment,177 which 
                                                                                                             
 173. David C. Gray, A Prayer for Constitutional Comparativism in Eigth 
Amendment Cases, 18 FED. SENT. R. 237 (2005-2006). 
 174. U.S. CONST. amend. II states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed.”  
 175. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 176. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1524 (2011). The same author has even suggested 
natural law influences on the Ex Post Facto clause and the Equal Protection 
clause. Id. at 1526. 
 177. U.S. CONST. amend. V stating:  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crimes, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 




protects property unless the taking of it would be for the public 
use, and then it can only be taken upon compensation. It is also 
found explicitly stated in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
clause. For that clause declares that no person shall “be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  
(3) Freedom of conscience is represented in the freedom to 
exercise one’s religion.178 One’s religious beliefs are so close to 
their existence that a sudden denial of them may have severe 
psychological consequences. Moreover, religion, like greed for 
land and power, has caused wars and catastrophes throughout 
human history. Thus, the First Amendment179 represents a 
principle of natural law discovered during the Enlightenment—that 
human beings should have the freedom to protect their innermost 
beliefs, but should not force those beliefs upon others.180  
(4) The Freedom of communication can be found within the 
confines of the freedom of speech and of the press in the First 
Amendment.181 It can also be found within the limited protection 
afforded a free press by the natural law even in the monarchies of 
England.  
                                                                                                             
 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.  
 178. Another writer has noted the natural law influence on the First 
Amendment. Eugene C. Gerhart, The Doctrine of Natural Law, 26 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 76, 110 (1951) (citing Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 242-44 
(1788); THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 ff. and 545 ff. (1950)). 
 179. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  
 180. This rule has a cognate in what was said of the natural law’s freedom of 
conscience influence on the Prussian Civil Code. See Lucke, supra note 9, at 21 
(noting an absolute right to freedom of faith and conscience).  
 181. The natural law influence on the First Amendment has been shown 
before. Felix Morley, The Natural Law and The Right to Self-Expression, 4 NAT. 
L. INST. PROC. 75 (1951); see also Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural 
Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 913 (1992-1993) (stating, 
“These older ideas about freedom of speech and press—so different from those 
which prevail today—illustrate the significance of the eighteenth-century natural 
rights analysis for our understanding of modern constitutional rights.”)  




(5) Freedom from arbitrary law can be found in a number of 
places. It can be found, most of all, in the Ninth Amendment,182 
and can also be found in the Due Process clauses of the 
Constitution. Although I believe that the Due Process clauses 
ought to be limited to simple process and the Ninth Amendment 
should address of non-enumerated rights, persuasive authority has 
long decided that the Substantive Due Process of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Fifth Amendment create a host of different 
rights, protected under different conditions.183 Moreover, other 
scholars have investigated the natural law foundations of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause.  
(6) The natural rights of assembly and petition may be said to 
derive from the notion that the government’s purpose is to protect 
its people, and that the government gathers its power from the 
consent of those governed and not simply by the fixing of laws.184 
This is so because a government concerned with the consent of its 
people must listen to their pleas for redress. Their textual home is 
the First Amendment proscriptions on prohibiting such rights.  
(7) The natural right to self-government has its place in 
multiple parts of the Constitution. To show the example of this—
based on text—requires using multiple provisions of the 
Constitution. First, it is evident that being able to petition the 
government tells us that people have some right to attempt to 
change their government. The other provisions that give a 
constitutional home to the natural right of self-government are not 
in the Bill, but in the original Constitution. Chief among these is 
the fact that both chambers of Congress are elected, that the 
Executive is elected, and that even the Judiciary must go through 
                                                                                                             
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. IX states: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
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 183. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive 
Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 FL. L. REV. 519 (2008). 
 184. See Declaration of Independence (noting that the only just government 
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an elected body to be approved. Moreover, Article IV, Section 4 
tells us that the Federal Government must guarantee to each state a 
republican form of government. As we all know, a republican form 
of government is self-governing.  
(8) There is, moreover, another facet of the natural law that 
appears in the Constitution. This can be seen in the Eight 
Amendment.185 Another scholar has pointed out that “the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment” is an 
example of the natural law being connected with the 
Constitution.186 According to that scholar, the determination of 
what is cruel under the Amendment “is not the same as 
determining what the framers and other residents of late-eighteenth 
century America thought was cruel.”187 But instead, determining 
what is cruel under the Eighth Amendment is to determine what is 
now and always has been cruel and unusual punishment. One may 
see cognates to cruel and unusual punishments in the European 
model of abolishing torture of war prisoners as a result of natural 
law theory.188 For there, as in the Eighth Amendment, we are 
dealing with government confining people and subjecting them to 
a type of punishment for which they have not been convicted and, 
likely, do not deserve.  
Finally, we arrive at perhaps the most apparent invocation of 
the natural law in the Constitution—the Ninth Amendment.189 The 
Ninth Amendment has already been called the  
“natural law’s logical textual home within the Constitution.”190 It 
has further been stated, “the founders intend the Ninth Amendment 
                                                                                                             
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  
 186. Gray, supra note 173. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Lucke, supra note 9, at 24 (noting the natural law-based opposition to 
torture).  
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to serve multiple purposes, including a role as a judicially 
enforceable source of natural law rights.”191  
Now, it may be horrifying to some to suggest that a court may 
look to the Ninth Amendment and simply create rules based on 
natural law. That fear is erroneous for two reasons. First, the 
natural law is not simply looking up to the clouds to find an 
answer, but is rather “reason, unaffected by desire.”192 By this I 
mean that the natural law is supposed to be discovered based upon 
rational, axiomatic principles. Second, we may curtail any attempts 
by the judiciary to create rules out of whole cloth by adopting the 
method by which the civil law has long handled the natural law as 
it relates to their written codes. This is the above-mentioned 
civilian method.  
As spelled-out in detail by Professor Franklin, the natural law 
does not have to be formless.193 Rather, we use the civilian method 
to control it. Thus, it is the natural law that a judge ought to 
compare to the provisions of the document to create new rules. The 
natural law and the understanding of the framing era may be used 
to “fill up” the broad provisions of the Constitution, but creating 
other rights that are not historically provided for should come 
through analogical development of the text. The Civilians call this 
method “au-delà du Code civil mais par le Code civil” (beyond the 
civil code but through the civil code).194 Constitutional scholars, 
such as Professor Coenen of LSU Law, have unintentionally 
studied this method by calling it the “combination analysis.”195  
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 192. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS at Bk. III, ch. 16.  
 193. See generally Franklin, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 116 
(explaining how the Ninth Amendment reflects the civil law method and how 
such a method may curb judicial attempts at simply making up rules).  
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on the Constitution to a possible later essay. This serves as a mere introduction 
to that topic.  
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Indeed, as stated before, the text of the Ninth Amendment 
supports such an interpretation—because we are not supposed to 
use the rights listed to deny those not expressly protected, we must 
use the enumerated rights to divine those that are not expressly 
protected. 
4. The Argument from Phraseology 
Further still, the very phrasing of all of these rights in the 
Constitution denotes a natural law. For all of these rights are not 
ones being granted by the Constitution or the government. They 
are phrased as “the right.” Meaning they are phrased as pre-
existing rights.196 They not only pre-date any laws that may apply 
to them, but they also pre-date the Constitution. Thus, one must 
ask, “where do these rights comes from?” The answer obviously 
cannot be the common law; for by declaring independence, the 
framers broke with the common law.197 Even if one assumes a 
common law basis for these rights, he or she must also assume a 
natural law basis, as it is well-established that the common law had 
a substantial natural law basis, although generally drawn from the 
                                                                                                             
 
invalidation of government action that each provision would permit in 
isolation.”). 
 196. My argument is strengthened by the words of Thomas Jefferson, who 
stated: 
I deride with you the ordinary doctrine, that we brought with us from 
England the common law rights. This narrow notion was a favorite in 
the first movement of rallying to our rights against Great Britain. But, it 
was that of men who felt their rights before they had thought of their 
explanation. The truth is, that we brought with us the rights of men; of 
expatriated men. 
See letter from Jefferson to Tyler, Monticello, 17 June 1812, in 6 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 65 (H.A.Washington ed., 1854) (cited in Franklin, 
Concerning the Influence, supra note 41, at 645). 
 197. It should be noted that: 
[I]mmediately after the Revolution, there was a widespread feeling that 
efforts should be made to develop a particular American jurisprudence, 
which would not be just a slavish imitator of the English common law, 
but would be eclectic—selecting the best principles and methods form 
whatever system they might be found. 
STEIN, CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE, supra note 58, at 415.  




facts of each case or situation. Moreover, they could not have 
come from the English crown, otherwise it would have been unjust 
for the revolutionaries to have broken away—if the rights were 
derived from the crown, then the crown would have had every 
authority to take them away. Moreover, the rights could not have 
come simply from their having been English subjects. Once they 
left the crown, they were no longer English subjects and thus 
would not have had these “rights.” Not only that, but as has been 
noted above, not everyone living in the United States was 
English.198 Nor did they all consider themselves English. Even 
among the most politically powerful of the time were some not of 
English descent.199 This means that those who ratified the 
Constitution (the people) would not have believed their rights 
came from being English. All of these reasons, combined with 
what was detailed above, conclusively show that the natural law of 
the Enlightenment had a profound impact upon the American 
Constitution.  
Thus, one may say that reasoning from the Constitution’s 
text—a strictly positivist notion—leads to a complete refutation of 
legal positivism. If we are going to understand the Constitution at 
all, or understand it as an Enlightenment code, we must understand 
its natural law composition, and be able to apply it to our 
interpretation of the document.  
Lastly, I must mention that like the civilians and their codes, 
the framers had to bow to political pressure. Just as the Prussian 
drafters and Martini wanted to limit the intrusion of the monarchy 
on human rights, but had to give way to the politically powerful 
kings at the time, so too did many framers want to curtail slavery 
under the natural law but were forced to yield to the politically 
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powerful slave-holding states. In any event, the Constitution is still 
influenced by the natural law.200  
IV. ARTICLE III: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CODES AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
The last two qualities of an Enlightenment era code are these: 
completeness and abrogation.201 Abrogation, on one hand, is the 
theory that the new code does more than simply compile or restate 
the existing law, but rather terminates the existing law from having 
any force at all—even subsidiary force. The old law cannot even 
be used to fill in the gaps between the new written laws, although it 
may be used to help define terms and fill up broadly-written 
provisions. Completeness, on the other hand, means that the 
document covers the totality of civil society,202 on either the whole 
spectrum of law or on a specific era of law and is meant to be such 
for a very long period of time.203 Completeness itself has two 
primary methods of obtaining this goal: specific enumeration or 
broadly written law. One may see that the Constitution uses both of 
these methods and fulfills both of these functions.  
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The notion of abrogation has been used since Justinian’s 
Corpus Juris Civilis, when the Emperor released his lawyers from 
ever having to cite to the old law again, and that the new body of 
law was the sole source, complete in itself.205 This same idea 
carried over to each one of the great codes of Europe.206  
The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the need for 
abrogation in the now-infamous case of Cottin v. Cottin:207 
It must not be lost sight of, that our civil code is a digest of 
the civil laws, which were in force in this country, when it 
was adopted; that those laws must be considered as 
untouched, wherever the alterations and amendments, 
introduced in the digest, do not reach them; and that such 
parts of those laws only are repealed, as are either contrary 
to, or incompatible with the provisions of the code.208 
Thus, in order to say that the Constitution is a code, in the vein 
of the Enlightenment, it must be shown that it decisively broke 
from the prior law. Now, there are many methods by which 
abrogation can be done. The most powerful is expressed 
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abrogation.209 This is, of course, an article of a code, which states 
that all prior laws are abrogated. The second method is tacit repeal, 
where something about the new law makes it obvious that all of the 
old law was repealed.210 It is the second method by which the 
Constitution abrogates all prior public law.  
First, I must admit that no rational person would even suggest 
that the Constitution did not abrogate the English and European 
rules on government. That is to suggest, no one would say when 
addressing a possible gap about what the powers of government 
are, or what the rights of persons are, by asking what is done in 
England or France. That question would only come into play in 
defining or filling up the broad provisions of the law. Moreover, 
this point is made even clearer by the rule that “all interpretation of 
the Constitution must begin with its text.”211 For if the document 
did not abrogate all prior law and there were a gap in the type of 
law covered by the Constitution, then that gap would have 
certainly been discovered by now; and for the answers to that 
question, the justices would have appealed to the pre-existing rules 
of law without reference to the Constitution.  
Further, the Constitution creates a general government of 
enumerated powers. All those powers that the national government 
has are found in the Constitution, with others only coming in as 
necessary and proper to fulfill the government’s other powers.212 
Thus, it is clear that the Constitution abrogated any common law 
rules on the powers of government. For example, in England the 
national government was able to establish a church, which is 
anathema to the American Constitution, and is expressly made so 
by the Establishment clause of the First Amendment.  
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Put simply, abrogation is the reason why, in determining if the 
federal government can do some act, we ask (1) does the 
Constitution say the government can, and (2) if so, does the 
Constitution elsewhere say that the government can’t? If the 
Constitution had not abrogated the prior law, the questions would 
be (1) does the Constitution say you can, (2) if not, do the other 
laws say you can (3) if so, does something else in the Constitution 
say you can’t? Thus, the American Constitution is the sole source 
of foundational law that, at a minimum, the government must 
obey, and the sole source of that general government’s powers.213 
There are, however, two clauses in the Constitution that may 
seem at first glance to defeat my argument for abrogation. The first 
is Article VI,214 which tells us that all debts incurred by the 
national government under the Articles of Confederation are to be 
held to the same extent against the new government. One may 
suggest that if the new government is taking care of the debts of 
the old, then the old is not really gone. In response, I argue that 
taking on responsibilities of the former regime does not undo 
abrogation. In fact, it furthers my argument. For, by officially 
announcing that the former is gone and that the new will hold its 
debts, the charter is stating that the former is actually gone. 
Moreover, taking care of the other’s debts does not mean that the 
former regime is not gone. Indeed, the Article is nothing more than 
an assurance that the people who created the federal government 
would not be defaulting on their promises to foreign nations. 
Lastly, the Confederation is long since dead. Any bond it had not 
paid back by the time of the Philadelphia convention has most 
certainly been paid back by now. Thus, if the Article could once 
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have been read as defeating abrogation, it could not be so now, the 
target of clause itself is long resolved.  
The second portion of the Constitution which may give 
abrogation trouble is the Seventh Amendment, which states that: 
In suits at common law, where the value on controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall 
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than 
according to the rules of the common law. 
One may argue that the mention of the “common law” in the 
Amendment signify that the common law has not been abrogated 
for constitutional reasons. This argument fails to comprehend the 
fact that codes frequently adopt old rules. This clause does nothing 
but adopt the term “common law” in the first instance to described 
lawsuits, and merely adopts “common law” in the second instance 
to denote the procedure by which the jury verdicts may be 
reexamined.215 Put another way, the Seventh Amendment merely 
reflects that the Constitution received a portion of the common 
law.  
B. Completeness216 
If one understood the Constitution to simply be a super 
common law jurisdiction statute, it would have to be understood to 
have dealt solely with the problems of the time and to have been 
immediately actionable by the people at the time of the framing. 
However, if one understands the Constitution as a supreme code, 
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then it would in fact cover every situation placed before it. We 
have, since the beginning of our republic, interpreted the 
Constitution in the latter vein. For as the Marbury court noted, the 
Constitution is not some static legal code,217 similar to one which 
could have seen in England at the time. Rather, it is meant to 
extend eternally forward and touch on every debate that may be 
presented to it.218 
The first method of extending eternally forward to every case is 
generality.219 Portalis articulated the general rule that a code ought 
not to provide rules that are immediately applicable to every 
conceivable concrete case. On the contrary, it must lay down the 
rules of law broadly enough to regulate all situations of a certain 
type that may arise from human interaction and must not lay down 
specific solutions relating to particular circumstances.220 However, 
the code must also be practical and not abstract to the point that it 
would be worthless.221 In solving this conundrum, Portalis stated: 
How does one arrest the passing of time? How can one 
oppose the course of events or the imperceptible change of 
custom? How can one know and calculate in advance 
things which only experience can reveal? Can foresight 
ever extend to things our minds cannot grasp? . . . Many 
things are therefore necessarily left to the arbitration of 
judges. The function of the [Code] is to set down, in broad 
terms, the general maxims of law, to establish principles 
rich in consequences, and not to deal with particulars of the 
questions that may arise on every subject. It is left to the 
magistrate and the jurisconsult, fully alive to the overall 
spirit of laws, to guide their application.222  
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The second method of covering every possible situation is 
specific enumeration. Simply put, this method held that a code 
could set forth the rule for every single possible situation. The 
Prussian Code is generally thought of as using this method. This is 
the same method that was used by Justinian and his CJS.223 
However, both ultimately suffered the same consequences. The 
CJS needed frequent updating to the point that a fourth portion was 
added.224 Likewise, the Prussian Code needed almost constant 
updating, for specific enumeration cannot arrest the passage of 
time. That is, until the American Constitution’s theory of the 
general government, specific enumeration could not arrest the 
passage of time. Thus, specific enumeration is maintainable if the 
powers given are specifically limited.  
The genius of the Constitution is that it does not disregard 
specific enumeration for broad generality, nor does it do away with 
broad generality. Thus, it has accomplished the same feat as the 
European codes—it found the perfect middle ground between 
general and specific, theoretical and practical.225 Indeed, it has 
already been stated that, “[The] emancipation from particularism is 
characteristic, above all, in the succinct Constitution of the United 
States and in terse code of the modern civil law, such as that of 
France….”226 The same author noted, “the flexible texts of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and elsewhere may be called abstract . . . 
universals;” a comparison may thus be made between “due 
process” in the Constitution and “good faith” of the codes.227  
These abstract universals and the broad generalities in which 
the Amendments are written, especially those on individual rights, 
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allow for growth in the law.228 The framers believed that human 
rights were essentially innumerable. It follows that they would 
have written these provisions broadly to allow them to grow and 
morph to meet future situations. Such a connection between the 
goals of individual rights being construed broadly and the 
understanding of the codes in Europe was unmistakably given by 
Justice Story in the 1816 opinion of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee:229 
The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious 
sense, and not in a sense unreasonable restricted or 
enlarged.230 The constitution unavoidably deals in general 
language. It did not suit the purposes of the people in 
framing this great charter of our liberties to provide for 
minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means 
by which those powers should be carried into execution.231 
The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the 
exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long 
lapse of ages the events of which were locked up in the 
inscrutable purposes of Providence.232 It could not have 
been foreseen what new changes and modifications of 
power might be indispensable to effectuate the general 
principles of the charter.233  
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Therefore, the Constitution’s broad general principles of law, 
combined with the methods of gap-filling discussed above, bring 
unforeseeable, historically unprovided-for situations under the 
purview of the Constitution, thereby making it complete.  
Specific enumeration is taken up in the context of the 
enumerated powers of the Federal government. Aside from these 
powers and those procedures that are necessary and proper to 
fulfill the enumerated powers, no other authority exists for the 
federal government’s actions.234 Not even a strong government 
interest235 is enough to generate government power—it must be 
specified in the Constitution. This presents a stark contrast to the 
problem faced by the Prussian Code and the Corpus Juris’ use of 
specific enumeration. In those documents we find that the specific 
enumeration, setting forth very restrictive rules, lead to a need for 
constant revision and update. Other answers had to be provided for 
these minute situations because courts were unable to extend by 
analogy the very specific clauses. The Constitution does not face 
this problem. For even where it is silent, something that ostensibly 
could require the creation of new powers or new rules of law (as to 
the power of the federal government), it gives an answer. That 
answer is, “no, the federal government cannot not do this.”236 
Thus, the Constitution was able to specifically provide for every 
possible instance of federal power, by making those (and those 
necessary and proper thereto) the only instances of federal power.  
Moreover, the Constitution, like the codes of Europe, has 
devices that allowed for the document to extend continuously even 
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in the face of apparent gaps in the law. We have already discussed 
the Roman method above. But here, we will discuss it in the 
context of completeness. Here, we must steer clear of the full 
discussion on the civilian method of looking at the principles of 
law, and maintain focus on that clause of the constitution which 
declares that the analogical development of text be used—the 
Ninth Amendment.  
The Ninth Amendment declares that there are other rights 
protected by the Constitution, even if they are not written down. It 
is sad that this Amendment has not yet shown its full potential. But 
by its existence the Ninth actually gives the judges who decide the 
case the power to locate and protect these rights. The text of the 
Ninth can actually do a great deal of work. As noted above, read to 
its negative, the Amendment tells us that a judge ought to use the 
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights and elsewhere in the 
Constitution to discover previously unnoticed rights. Thus, the 
Constitution’s listing of rights would not be confined to those 
broad principles of the eighteenth century.  
Read in its ordinary meaning, the Amendment may even allow 
for reference to natural law in order to discover new rules on 
human rights. This would be beyond the context of simply saying 
that the natural law requires judges to rely upon the text.  
Thus, the Ninth Amendment allows for the Constitution to 
cover every possible situation which may arise involving 
individual rights that are not covered in the text elsewhere. In so 
discovering those rights, a court ought to look to the principles 
announced in the other provisions, by reading them together to 
create new rules, and by reference to the natural law when the text 
of the Constitution fails to provide a solid answer. Thus, in 
assuming control of the natural law, the Constitution’s protections 
on the issue of individual freedoms are literally universal and 
complete, because all possible protections of rights are given effect 




by the Constitution, and only an appropriate government interest237 
can abrogate those protections. In so being, the Amendment is 
similar to the former Section 7 of the Austrian Civil Code, which 
stated:  
If a case cannot be decided by applying the words or the 
natural meaning of a statute, one must take into 
consideration similar cases which are dealt with in other 
statutes in a definite manner and the reasons behind such 
statutes. If a doubt remains, the case must be decided by 
applying natural legal principles, having given mature 
consideration to the carefully gathered circumstances.238  
Therefore, the Constitution is functionally a code, because the 
document abrogates the prior law and is complete over its specific 
era of law. The similarities between the framing document and the 
codes of Europe can no longer be ignored. The Constitution is an 
Enlightenment code.  
C. Consequences 
Showing that the Constitution functions like an Enlightenment 
code and has the requisite other features would be a moot task, if 
there were not some consequence that would result from such a 
revelation. A full delineation of the consequences is saved for 
another essay. However, it feels appropriate to briefly address a 
few of such consequences here.  
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First and foremost, it cannot be denied that the Supreme Court 
and the lower federal courts have the power to interpret the 
Constitution and to declare acts null under its provisions. Such a 
power is blatantly obvious with the “arising under the 
Constitution” rule in Article III. What sort of suits would “arise 
under the Constitution” except for those challenging acts as not 
being constitutional? The answer is none. This may, however, be 
incompatible with the notion of stare decisis. It has already been 
noted by prominent scholarship that the text and form of the 
Constitution is anathema to stare decisis.239 The courts have just 
not realized that fact yet.  
As it stands now, the only way the Supreme Court will 
overturn inaccurate precedent is if it is wrong enough.240 Not if it is 
wrong, but only if it is wrong enough. This ought to seem absurd 
to anyone familiar with the concept that judges are supposed to 
interpret and apply the law, not make it. Moreover, even if lower 
courts notice massive errors in the Supreme Court’s decisions, they 
are bound by those prior cases. The only way a lower court may 
get away with not applying the rule developed by the high court is 
by somehow distinguishing the cases.  
Just imagine, if there had been no binding authority to the 
Supreme Court’s erroneous decision in the Slaughter House 
Cases,241 then the States would likely not have gotten away with as 
many atrocities as they did until the incorporation of substantive 
due.  
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If we do adopt the idea that the Constitution is a supreme code, 
then the decisions of the United States Supreme Court would not 
be binding upon the lower courts or the Court itself. Of course, 
those decisions would be binding upon the parties who happen to 
be in the suit. And, of course, those decisions may help other 
courts decide cases, so long as they adopt the appropriate 
understanding of jurisprudence.  
There are a few theories of jurisprudence in civil law 
jurisdictions. The first is that of “probable doctrine,”242 where an 
issue has been decided so many times by a higher court that it is 
probably the right way to rule. The second is “jurisprudence 
constante”243 meaning that precedent only becomes strongly 
influential after it has been almost universally agreed to being the 
right interpretation of the law. This is the method which is 
supposed to be used in Louisiana and is widely used in civilian 
jurisdictions. Considering that the majority of jurisdictions have 
adopted the third method, and considering it was that method that 
was ruling the day in Europe at the time of the Enlightenment, and 
that it was to be used by our founders’ greatest ally, France, it 
seems appropriate to state that it should be the method used.  
I understand the concern about whether such a situation would 
be appropriate; after all, would we want lower courts allowing 
States to bypass decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education?244 
Moreover, one may point out that in civilian jurisdictions, the 
Constitutional Courts’ rulings are binding. It may be due to a 
pragmatic development.  
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2. Implications for Several Current Doctrines 
(1) Since this theory focuses heavily on the natural law, and 
argues that there may be some sort of general jurisprudence 
ordained by the Constitution, this would certainly have an impact 
on the Erie245 doctrine, which appears to be based on the notions 
that (1) there is no natural law, and (2) there is no general law 
discoverable or which may be applied by the federal courts. 
(2) This theory asserts that the Constitution adopted the 
Enlightenment notion that government has only one purpose—the 
protection of human rights. If this is so, then the only legitimate 
government interest (as hinted at above) is the protection of 
individuals from others and the government. Such a consideration 
would have massive implications for weighing government interest 
against human rights in the context of equal protection, and 
substantive due process.246  
(3) Since this theory would require comparison of the text and 
discerning fundamental principles embedded in the text, we would 
be forced to review the notion of constitutional protections for 
juridical persons. By this I mean that in reading the Bill of Rights it 
is clear that “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution have 
the capacity to enjoy all the rights listed in the document, and are 
protected under it, even though they cannot yet exercise those 
rights, until they are taken away after due process is given. Thus, it 
cannot be that one may start out with enjoyment of some rights and 
not others. But this is exactly what the American corporate 
personhood doctrine suggests—that there are some constitutional 
persons that may have the capacity of enjoyment for some but not 
all of these rights initially,247 even before they are taken away with 
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due process. Therefore, if my theory is adopted, either corporations 
have the capacity of enjoyment for every single right, both 
enumerated and non-enumerated (as natural persons) or they have 
none. But since it has already been agreed that it is logically 
impossible for corporations to enjoy some rights (the right against 
self-incrimination, since corporations lack an actual “self”), then 
that means they cannot be considered “persons” within the 
meaning of the Constitution. Thus, they have no constitutionally 
protected rights; they have only those created by ordinary statute.  
(4) Substantive due process will be a thing of the past under my 
theory, because we are to give an average person reading to the 
words of a law. But a provision that speaks to “process” means 
only that: “process.” The only way to logically get “substance” out 
of “process” would be if there were really no difference between 
them.248 Moreover, all the work of substantive due process would 
already have been done by the Privileges or Immunities clause 
incorporating all of the rights held by the federal government 
against the states.249 This would also mean, of course, that the 
Privileges or Immunities clause would have to incorporate all of 
the unwritten rights of the Constitution.250  
(5) Because we would likely adopt other code based 
theories,251 we would likely adopt the use of foreign law to help fill 
up the broad provisions on human rights, so long as that foreign 
law had a similar basis in its development as our constitutional 
provision. I can think of no better example than the Eighth 
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Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.252 However, 
because we must relay back and forth between the texts of the 
Constitution, I must sadly admit that such use of foreign law could 
not abolish the death penalty. However, it could end imprisonment 
for drug offenses, as many other nations have begun to abolish 
such actions. The more that other nations change their treatment of 
drug offenders and users, the more the United States would 
become increasingly “unusual” in its treatment of drug offenders. 
Such a disparity between the United States and other nations could 
inform our understanding of what is cruel and unusual. 
(6) Original intent would be dead. The intent of the framers—
by that, I mean their original application of the Constitution—
would only be one part of the puzzle in interpreting the broad 
provisions of the Constitution. However, resort should be made to 
the original understanding in “defining” what the words mean. For 
example, if the Constitution contained the word “fence,” but that 
word actually meant what we call today a “dog,” it would be 
imperative to know what the framers definition was in order to 
help locate the appropriate principle. 
With this in mind, I realize that there would be an 
insurmountable amount of disinterest in adopting my idea as a 
whole. Even though conceptually the Constitution is an 
Enlightenment code, many would likely not wish to adopt all of 
these consequences.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Two centuries ago, at the height of the Enlightenment age, our 
founders set forth the national charter—a document filled with 
natural law influence and lessons from Roman legal history. Its 
passages distilled these higher and ancient laws—derived from 
religion, reason, and nature—through practical experience into a 
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Constitution that abrogated control of the prior regimes and gave 
answers to all questions relevant to the fundamental law of our 
nation. All of these facts make the Constitution conceptually 
identical to the great codes of Europe, and like those legal titans, 
our Constitution has survived war, national poverty, and 
unpredictable social changes. But what has been overlooked is this: 
the Constitution has not had to undergo the full scale changes of 
the Enlightenment codes, it does not have the danger of an 
auxiliary code that may draw it out of the center of our national 
legal structure, and instead of merely adopting the natural law, it 
has become the natural law. Therefore, not only can we say that the 
Constitution is a code in a small compass, but we may also be 
justified in saying that it is the best code of them all.  
